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In a landscape where the principle of deterrence is deliberately punitive, offering 
assistance becomes ever more problematic for an organization and for the individ-
uals working within it, as the fight is not only for refugee rights but for resources 
and legitimacy (Cambridge/Williams 2004: 103). 
History teaches us how practices first reserved for foreigners find themselves 
applied later to the rest of the citizenry.1
1.1 1Introduction2
This chapter explores examples of how pro-asylum ad-
vocates challenge the harsh measures used to punish 
those who try to enter or reside in the EU illegally, 
taking examples from The Netherlands and the UK. 
We explore organized resistance to the ‘3-Ds’, which 
are so typical of EU-wide migration policies: destitu-
tion, detention and deportation. Together these are 
the backbone of policies of deterrence. Sections 2 and 
3 explore how ‘global apartheid’ and the ‘state of ex-
ception’ within the EU connect. Giorgio Agamben 
(2005) first theorized the “state of exception” and 
Kohler, “global apartheid” (1978). The state of excep-
tion is the regional context for pro-asylum advocacy 
work, and global apartheid is the global context 
within which the EU-wide state of exception can be 
understood (Webber 2000; Migreurop 2009)3. In sec-
tion 4, the ‘shared injustice frames’, or common 
worldviews, of pro-asylum advocacy networks in the 
EU, are briefly explored. 
Section 5 presents examples of pro-asylum advo-
cacy work from the UK and the Netherlands. These 
examples draw on our own background experience 
and research. We explore how two pro-asylum advo-
cacy organizations, one a loose network, the other a 
small NGO, have tried to organize to protect those 
seeking sanctuary against the 3-Ds.4 The right not to 
be deliberately made homeless, not to be imprisoned 
at will, and not to be forcibly expelled to dangerous 
countries, are thus the main focus of these organiza-
tions, and of section 5. In section 6, we briefly explore 
some positive recent developments, such as the ‘sanc-
tuary campaign’ in the UK, but also how resistance to 
deterrence policies has had to go ‘underground’ in 
the face of criminalization in both the EU and elsew-
here, such as Canada (Fekete 2009; Nyers 2003). The 
first example we explore is the the National Coalition 
for Anti-Deportation Campaigns (NCADC), a UK-
wide loose coalition of members and asylum support 
groups. We consider in particular NCADC’s 2007 
anti-deportation campaign around a charter flight to 1 Giorgio Agamben: “No to Political Tattooing”, in: Le 
Monde, 10 January 2004; at: <http://www.ratical.org/
ratville/CAH/totalControl.pdf> (24 June 2007).
2 This chapter draws on an earlier paper by Helen Hint-
jens, International Institute of Social Studies, The 
Hague and Ahmed Pouri, Participating Refugees in 
Multicultural Europe (PRIME), The Hague, entitled 
“Advocates in Fortress Europe: Working for Refugee 
Rights, which was presented at the International Confe-
rence on Migration at the Institute of Social Studies, on 
30-31 August 2007. 
3 See at: <http://www.poptel.org.uk/statewatch/news/
2005/aug/crimes-of-arrival.pdf> (20 August 2009); 
<http://www.migreurop.org/article1574.html> (6 Janu-
ary 2010).
4 The UK Independent Asylum Commission (2008) pro-
poses the term ‘sanctuary’ instead of asylum; at: <http://
www.independentasylumcommission.org.uk/> (3 May 
2010).
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lands, our example is Participating Refugees in Multi-
cultural Europe (PRIME), a Hague-based affiliate of 
Landelijke Ongedocumenteerde Stichting (LOS) [the 
National Organization for the Undocumented], an 
umbrella organization.5 We consider how PRIME 
worked with those who sought to benefit from the ge-
neral pardon, or amnesty, announced for some failed 
asylum seekers in 2008. At the end of section 5, we 
also present two individual profiles, two women – one 
in PRIME, the other in the NCADC network in the 
UK – who reflect on the state of exception and how 
pro-asylum advocacy has impacted on their lives. 
These global, EU-wide, national, local and individual 
aspects of pro-asylum advocacy are all connected in 
this chapter, just as they are for many advocates and 
those seeking sanctuary. 
Our research is based on pro-asylum research con-
ducted in both the UK and the Netherlands over sev-
eral years.6 The rise of racism in particular, explains 
our decision to connect global apartheid with the 
state of exception inside the EU. During our research, 
we became interested in how and why ordinary peo-
ple, including refugees and asylum seekers, engage in 
pro-asylum advocacy. They encountered the harsh re-
alities of deterrence policies, through experience and 
close contacts rather than by design or conviction 
alone. Section 6 reflects on how growing harmoniza-
tion of deterrence policies in the EU poses a danger 
to legitimate, organized resistance to the 3-Ds. The 
conclusion shows that it is becoming more urgent, 
and more difficult to do this work in the EU today 
(Fekete 2009). Some of the many contradictory forces 
besetting pro-asylum rights advocates in the EU 
should become clearer by the end of this chapter. 
1.2 Why Global Apartheid? 
Popularly referred to by Thabo Mbeki and Fidel Cas-
tro, among others, the term ‘global apartheid’ has 
also been used analytically by scholars like Anthony 
Richmond, Titus Alexander and Patrick Bond 
(Richmond 1994; Alexander 1996; Bond 2000). For 
Ali Mazrui, global apartheid resembles a global caste 
system (Mazrui 2007), and interestingly, during the 
formal apartheid era in South Africa the concept had 
already been theorized (Kohler 1978). In his classic: 
Immigration Law and Practice, Ian MacDonald com-
pared UK nationality and immigration laws with 
apartheid laws, since both created different categories 
of ‘nationals’, with unequal resources and unequal ac-
cess to the national territory (MacDonald 1983). Glo-
bal apartheid usefully conveys not only the scale of 
global inequalities, but also laws and policies aimed at 
their legitimization, and processes of coercive state 
enforcement. Dominant and protective self-determi-
nation underlies global apartheid, as it did South Afri-
can apartheid, with mainly white heartland popula-
tions claiming to be in danger (Kohler 1978; 
Richmond 1994). On the other hand, both global and 
South African forms of apartheid claim to protect the 
culture of the excluded peoples. 
State-designed, racially encoded, religiously loaded 
and (mostly) legally sanctioned internal controls to 
prevent cross-border movement and exclude those de-
fined as ‘undesirable’ have been intensifying interna-
tionally for some years (Bond 2000; Bauman 2004).
“[F]orcible isolation of people who are different” was 
already part of colonial segregation and expulsion, 
and in this sense is nothing new (Richmond 1994: 
206). Like colonial surveillance, today’s strategy is to 
screen entire groups of people out of entitlements 
and benefits, enforcing unequal life chances, this time 
in the hope of deterring future cross-border move-
ments (Zureik 2001; Albrecht 2002). Surveillance and 
control, neglect and violent exclusion are affected 
through a global grid of changing laws, as well as 
walls, barriers, sanctions and surveillance techniques. 
Many state policing functions are contracted out to 
transnational security corporations, making the role 
of corporate capital in global apartheid analogous to 
the part it played in South African apartheid (Falk 
2005; Bacon 2005). 
The border controls, detention centres, deporta-
tions and internal controls and surveillance, are delib-
erate deterrence policies, as are the 3-Ds domestically 
(Weber 2000). Their success is limited, however, and 
it seems governments compete between each other 
5 Stichting Landelijke Ongedocumenteerden Steunpunt
(LOS), or the National Advice Centre for Undocumen-
ted. Information about LOS from an interview with 
Rian Ederveen, Coordinator of LOS, The Hague, 2 
April 2007. 
6 By being involved in PRIME, in NCADC and other refu-
gee organizations, including UNHCR, the three authors 
of this chapter have been involved in campaigns, chal-
lenges to new laws, faith-based organizations, schools, 
voluntary groups and trade unions that have resisted the 
rise of racism and indifference to the suffering of asy-
lum seekers and the undocumented. 
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mented people, seen as the source of insecurity (Bhag-
wati 2003; Bigo 2001). An estimated half million un-
documented people reside in the UK, and around 
150,000 in the Netherlands. Yet from 2002 until 
2008, progressively fewer people were able to reach 
the UK or the Netherlands to claim asylum (Jandl 
2004: 6).7 Fleeing one’s ‘homeland’ does not imply 
reaching one’s destination and gaining sanctuary.8
“Scooped up like so many fishes, expelled by new se-
curity and policing systems, migrants are redefined as 
smugglers or smuggled, traffickers or trafficked, and 
asylum seekers have a hard time reaching safety, what-
ever they pay for the journey” (Loescher 1993). 
Almost by definition, “…the asylum seeker's 
flight…is tortuous…[and] is likely to be indirect, facili-
tated by commercial intermediaries and false docu-
ments” (Bhabha 2002: 156). This makes criminaliza-
tion relatively easy for EU governments. Ever-wider 
circles of border controls have made the EU almost 
impenetrable (e.g. FRONTEX polices the seas off the 
Canaries; EU funding helps pay for detention centres 
in Libya and Morocco). Neighbouring countries thus 
detain people for the EU, as ‘Fortress Europe’ seeks 
to close Mediterranean and North Africa routes (Mi-
greurop 2007; Maas 2007; van Houtum 2007; Bigo 
2001, JRS 20109).Even the principle of non-refoule-
ment (not being sent back across a border before an 
asylum case is properly heard), is routinely violated, 
not by disobedient officials, but by obedient ones. 
There lies the heart of the problem of global apart-
heid and the state of exception for pro-asylum advo-
cacy (Fekete 2001: 26; Helton 2002: 123; Maas 2007). 
In the UK, Heaven Crawley talks of the emer-
gence of a marked ‘culture of disbelief’ among Border 
Agency staff, including in relation to minors (Crawley 
2006). Similar attitudes have been reported in the 
Netherlands (HRW 2003).10 Violent assaults during 
detention and deportation have been documented 
across Europe (Fekete 2005). Rejected asylum seek-
ers, especially those without children, tend to go un-
derground rather than wait to be detained and forci-
bly deported. Unable to work, they cannot claim 
benefits, shelter or health care, and are subject to de-
tention and deportation without notice if caught. Tor-
ture and rape victims experience re-traumatization, 
and families become separated, all in the name of ef-
fective border controls. As one lawyer explains: 
…when people are subjected to routine fingerprinting, 
when they are locked up, when they are restrained by 
body belts and leg shackles and thirteen feet of tape, or 
forcibly injected with sedatives to keep them quiet as 
they are bundled on to an aircraft, it seems reasonable 
to ask: what have they done? The answer is that they 
have tried to come to Western Europe, to seek asylum, 
or to live here with their families, or to work here. And 
the whole panoply of modern policing, with its associ-
ated rhetoric, is applied against them (Webber 2000: 1).
Between Europe’s heartlands and the impoverished 
homelands, are in-between places that grow in 
number and variety; refugee camps, confined lands, 
militarized border zones; deserts criss-crossed by 
barbed wire, gun posts and walls (Bhagwati 2003; Col-
lyer 2007; Migreurop 2009). Meanwhile, govern-
ments and pliant media whip up collective insecurity, 
exaggerating the threats migrants pose, to justify new 
and more draconian exclusions imposed on undocu-
mented migrants (Bhabha 2002: 160 – 161; Bauman 
2004). Among many pro-asylum advocates in the EU 
today, a sense of urgency is tangible, in the face of or-
ganized human rights violations resulting from the 
‘state of exception’ within the EU.
1.3 An EU-wide State of Exception 
Along with the barbed wire, armed guards and walls, 
sophisticated biometric and satellite-tracking techni-
ques combine to produce multiple zones of simultane-
ous entrapment and exclusion. ‘Apartheid walls’ slice 
through space, while high-tech monitoring techniques 
assist with random checks of civilian populations, for 
example at airports and checkpoints (at the US bor-
der with Mexico, across Palestine). Within the EU, de-
tention camps mushroomed after the Cold War, as 
the state of exception grew and moved beyond the ef-
fective reach of international human rights norms and 
mechanisms. Free movement for goods and capital 
has meant more confinement for the world’s poor 
and desperate (Andreas 2000; Richmond 1994; Alex-
ander 1995; Cohen 1987). The philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben first developed the concept, ‘state of excep-
tion’, which refers to the combined might of state and 
7 Jo Woodbridge, 2005: Sizing the Unauthorized (illegal) 
Migrant Population in the United Kingdom in 2001, 
Online Home Office Report No. 29.05; at: <http://www.
homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05 rdsolr2905.pdf>: 5.
8 For this kind of analysis applied to Uganda, see Him-
bara/Sultan (1995), and for a more critical view on the 
use of “bantustan” in this way, see the comment by 
Doornbos (1996). 
9 See at: <http://www.with.jrs.net/files/DoTheyKnow. 
pdf> (4 January 2010).
10 See at: <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/04/08/
fleeting refuge-0> (4 January 2010).
4 Helen Hintjens, Richa Kumar and Ahmed Pouricorporate power to suspend normal rules of gover-
nance and legality, and to do so wherever and whene-
ver they so choose (Agamben 2005; Migreurop, 
2009).
Even prisoners have more rights than those held in 
this state in detention centres and camps across the 
EU.11 Detention is supposed to be used only as a last 
resort, or immediately prior to deportation, but in-
stead is routinely used as a form of deterrence, both 
in the UK and the Netherlands (Bacon 2005: 4). Even 
the sick, disabled and small children, can disappear 
through forced deportation. Those who struggle, fear-
ful of deportation, are sometimes restrained and 
drugged during the removal process. Thus, every day 
on chartered and civilian long-haul flights interna-
tional law is violated (Migreurop 2007; Fekete 2005, 
2009). Pro-asylum advocates try to bring such stories 
of resistance to media attention, but often the media 
feels that these stories are not news. Only when the 
unusual and sensational occurs (a suicide or hunger 
strike among detainees or, a fire in a detention centre) 
do the media report on the detention centres 
(Hintjens/Jarman 2003; Athwal 2006).12 
Under the state of exception, living conditions are 
made as harsh as possible for undocumented people, 
to encourage them to leave Europe voluntarily. But 
this strategy seems not to be working (Albrecht 2002; 
Bacon 2008). Governments can force people onto the 
streets, lock them away in detention centres, take 
their children into foster care, but conditions in their 
country of origin remain life threatening, and very few 
people will voluntarily return to DRC, Iraq or other 
dangerous places. In a world where increasing pres-
sures push people to move, and where the displaced 
are denied “rights and equality as they do what they 
have to do to survive”, there is no obvious, politically 
acceptable solution (Bacon 2008: vi). Under such glo-
bal conditions, the most likely response to deterrence 
is evasion and illegal flight (Bacon 2008; Athwal 
2006).
A cat-and-mouse game ensues between private 
‘fixers’, ships’ captains, border police and lifeguards, 
in which rescue at sea is reclassified as smuggling, and 
people can be locked up for helping those drowning 
off-shore. Private security firms are heavily involved in 
detention and deportation, and run most of the UK’s 
immigration centres (Bacon 2005). Their profits de-
pend on government failure; however, since detention 
centres would be redundant if nobody could enter the 
UK, for instance. This is not likely to happen, as vio-
lent conflicts, human rights violations and growing 
global inequalities fuel these movements (Bhagwati 
2003).
Overt physical and mental abuses are widely re-
ported across EU detention centres (Migreurop 
2009). In 2009, riot police attacked peaceful hunger 
strikers in Schiphol detention centre in the Nether-
lands without warning, causing serious injuries, not 
long after they began to refuse food.13 In a separate 
incident, families with children on hunger strike in 
Yarlswood in the UK, experienced almost exactly 
identical attacks (Fekete 2009: 89).14 Physical use of 
force is symptomatic of the state of exception, and of 
the deterrence logic underpinning migration policies 
across the EU (Agamben 2005; Migreurop 2009).
Agamben has compared torture in detention today 
with torture in Nazi concentration camps, and insists 
that, “…situation is legally speaking actually compara-
ble [since]…the detainees of Guantanamo do not have 
the status of Prisoners of War, they have absolutely no 
legal status…. They are subject only to raw power; 
they have no legal existence.”15 Those in asylum de-
tention are similarly forgotten, although less com-
pletely removed from the rule of law, and can find 
their basic rights arbitrarily suspended. There are 
some parallels between the ‘terror estate’ and the ‘de-
tention estate’ (Bacon 2005). Images of ‘scrounging’ 
11 A map, regularly updated by the French migrants’ rights 
organization, MIGREUROP, shows the number and 
types of open and closed detention centres and migra-
tion and refugee camps across Europe, and makes for 
horrifying comparisons with similar maps of concentra-
tion and forced labour camps during World War 2. See 
at: <http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/carte-en. pdf>
(20 December 2009). 
12 Helen Hintjens, 2007: “The War for Illegals”, in: Bad 
Subjects website special issue on ‘Hope’; at: <http://bad.
eserver.org/issues/2007/78/> (29 November 2008). 
13 Ahmed Pouri; Helen Hintjens: “Hunger Strikers 
attacked inside Schiphol’s Detention Centre”, in: 
PRIME Press Release, 9 March 2009; at: <http://indy-
media.nl/nl/2009/03/58112.shtml> (2 June 2009). 
14 Helen Hintjens: “Unveiling the Truth in The Nether-
lands: Attack on Hunger Strikers Inside Amsterdam’s 
Schiphol Airport Detention Center”, PRIME Press 
Release; at: <http://theporcupine.org/?p=135> (2009); 
National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns
(NCADC), at: <http://www.ncadc.org/> includes a list 
of successful cases defended, 141 in all, totalling more 
than 300 people. 
15 Giorgio Agamben: “No to political tattooing”, in: Le 
Monde, 10 January 2004; at: <http://www.ratical.org/
ratville/CAH/totalControl.pdf> (24 June 2007).
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public bias, creating an increased sense of insecurity 
and resentment against asylum seekers (Bigo 2001). 
The state of exception explains how spaces cre-
ated by governments, with corporate partners, can be 
placed outside normal ‘rules of the democratic game’ 
and beyond due process (Agamben 2005). In this 
state, a person can be moved about at will, mistreated 
and ignored. In Agamben’s terms, this is the human 
being in the condition of ‘naked life’ (homo sacer) 
(Agamben 1998). What the public sees is usually an-
other side of the story, as when: “our television cam-
eras [are] focused on the gallant policemen rounding 
up the ‘illegals’ and sans papiers and transporting 
them to the nearest refugee camp” (Bauman 2007: 
22). Inside the camp, the cameras usually stop rolling, 
and there is “not much to report”. 
Within the EU, the state of exception means en-
forced detention, forced destitution and implementa-
tion of annual deportation quotas and targets. Pro-
asylum workers, including teachers, social workers, 
lawyers, doctors and family members, friends, church 
or mosque members, know about the state of excep-
tion, through experience, and through seeing the ex-
perience of others, and most recently through a range 
of ‘crimes of solidarity’ (Fekete 2009). Starting with a 
2002 EU Directive and Framework Decision, which 
requires “member states to create offences of directly 
or indirectly aiding the unauthorized entry, movement 
or residence of non-EU nationals”, governments have 
been arresting and convicting those who support un-
documented people, including in the UK (Fekete 
2009). 
Humanitarian NGOs and human rights advocates, 
and those living with anyone classified as illegal or li-
able to deportation, are themselves criminalized for 
helping undocumented migrants. Prosecutions have 
already begun in a number of EU countries (Fekete 
2009: 84), and pro-asylum advocacy has become a 
riskier business (Black 2003; Nyers 2003; Fekete 
2009; Webber 2000; Athwal Harmit 2006). Some 
common level of understanding of what confronts 
them has forged a kind of identity among pro-asylum 
advocates, in the form of a shared worldview.
1.4 Shared Injustice Frames and Pro-
asylum Stories 
The notion of a ‘shared injustice frame’, as elaborated 
by Olesen (2003), is a useful way to reflect on shared 
worldviews that arise among those involved in pro-
asylum advocacy networks in the EU. A common view 
is widely shared of how the world works, and what 
people confront in asserting their rights. These frames 
derive their power from their ability to bridge divi-
sions of class, identity, refugee status, gender, profes-
sional training and political and religious ideas. As re-
sistance to deterrence policies and laws has grown 
across the EU, shared understandings have risen that 
such policies and laws are both unjust and unworka-
ble. For pro-asylum advocates, the state of exception 
is illegitimate, and involves impunity for state and cor-
porate crimes against vulnerable people. A shared 
identity has thus started to emerge among pro-asylum 
advocates (Olesen 2005). How such shared injustice 
frames or transnational grievance perceptions, as 
Olesen calls them, produce shared forms of identifica-
tion is interesting, since: “…in contrast to a legitimat-
ing frame, [a shared injustice frame provides]…an in-
terpretation of what is happening that supports the 
conclusion that an authority system is violating the 
shared moral principles of the participants. An alter-
native to the legitimating frame, it provides a reason 
for non-compliance” (Olesen 2005: 31).
For pro-asylum advocates whether they support 
free movement or not, everyone seeking sanctuary in 
the EU have the right to claim protection and to fair 
and humane treatment in doing so. International law 
provides strong support for this premise (Loescher 
1993; Helton 2002). For pro-asylum advocates, deter-
rence-based approaches to migration are clearly in-
compatible with human rights principles and prac-
tices, and with any sense of justice or fairness. 
Through a wide range of responses, such as media 
pressure, diplomatic dialogue, legal challenge, street 
demonstrations and public citizen campaigns, pro-asy-
lum advocacy networks resist the official view that 
such policies can be justified. Cases are taken to 
court, debates organized in Parliaments, media and 
civil society training programmes conducted, and in-
formation communicated through radio, press, film 
and internet. While strategies may vary, the challenge 
of delegitimizing official claims that cruel policies are 
unavoidable to deter future inflows is a shared chal-
lenge. Inside knowledge of detention and deportation 
regimes helps to discount such official claims. Most 
advocates have first-hand evidence of the state of ex-
ception and the way it violates all basic human rights 
principles. The localized practices of contestation 
they use also have in-built connections to perceptions 
of global injustices. As Sassen puts it: 
(these) types of political practice(s)…are not the cosmo-
politan route to the global. They are global through the 
6 Helen Hintjens, Richa Kumar and Ahmed Pouriknowing multiplication of local practices. These are 
types of sociability and struggle deeply embedded in 
people’s actions and activities. They are also forms of 
institution-building work with global scope that can 
come from localities and networks of localities with lim-
ited resources and from informal social actors (Sassen 
2004: 662). 
Advocates thus inform the wider public about what 
they can do, tell harrowing, but also hopeful, stories 
of individuals, families and minority groups daring to 
challenge the deterrence logic and the state of excep-
tion. Advocates thus strategically make public what 
should otherwise remain private experiential or pro-
fessional knowledge (Carpenter 2007; Athwal 2006). 
Through stories of what refugees can do in the face of 
official indifference and abuse, advocates can show 
how the deterrence regime dehumanizes both those 
subject to the state of exception, and those who en-
force it. Senior policymakers, and others distanced 
from the harsh realities of the 3-Ds, can thus be con-
fronted with firsthand stories, making advocates inter-
locutors of the undocumented, enabling them to 
speak directly in most cases by straddling several sphe-
res through internet or other forms of media (Cam-
bridge/Williams 2004). Charles Tilly explains that 
stories are a powerful instrument, since, “…like the 
plow [stories]…use a simple application of force to dig 
deep... they frustrate purists: they condense complex 
life into simple plots” (Tilly 2006: 95). If it suits their 
purposes, governments may be exposed as failing to 
meet their international legal obligations, and in ex-
treme cases it may be easy to find public sympathy, es-
pecially where stories concern the most vulnerable, es-
pecially children (Crawley 2006).  
By sharing a common view of what is wrong with 
the world, and by telling stories to highlight what is 
wrong, political identities of pro-asylum advocates are 
constructed upwards, as it were, from shared experi-
ences and insights. Shared injustice frames thus work 
to produce broader, overlapping alliances and rela-
tionships, among pro-asylum advocacy networks 
within, and also beyond, the EU. As a “transnational 
advocacy network”, those involved in pro-asylum ad-
vocacy are “bound together by shared values [and] a 
common discourse” (Keck/Sikkink 1998: 2). Our start-
ing point is this shared analysis by pro-asylum advo-
cates of the problems they confront both under glo-
bal apartheid and under the EU state of exception. As 
they do their work, such advocacy networks also to 
persuade others that official policies are illegitimate, 
and seek to extend their shared injustice frames’ 
through the media and greater public involvement. 
1.5 Pro-Asylum Advocacy: Examples 
from the UK and the Netherlands 
Advocacy can be defined as, “the process of identify-
ing with and representing a person's views and con-
cerns, in order to secure enhanced rights and entitle-
ments...” (Cambridge/Williams 2004: 98). Locality, 
gender, class, profession, refugee status, training and 
politics will all influence the experience and practice 
of advocacy. Awareness is the product of lived experi-
ence and professional training, and since most pro-
asylum advocacy networks operate informally and on 
a small scale, there are generally few material incen-
tives to such work; on the contrary. Offices of migrant 
and refugee organizations are generally small, clut-
tered and open long hours; almost nobody is on a per-
manent salary, many people work on goodwill alone. 
A few core people generally do most of the work. 
Even small organizations like NCADC and PRIME 
can have significant impacts on how national and 
more global immigration policies are imagined and re-
sisted, and perhaps redefined (Sassen 2004). Translo-
cal pro-asylum networks include a range of actors, 
from priests to politicians, lawyers to actors, office 
workers to poets, trade unionists, teachers, intellectu-
als, postal workers, unemployed and retired people, 
as well as lawyers and domestic workers. Many or 
most are themselves refugees, or asylum seekers. Oth-
ers are locals who may consider themselves ‘citizens 
of the world’, but who work mainly in a highly local-
ized way within their own city, region or neighbour-
hood. They often see themselves as engaged in a de-
fensive war to protect basic human rights for some of 
the most vulnerable people in their society (Migreu-
rop 2007).16
In one of the opening quotations to this chapter, 
Agamben suggests why people might get involved in 
pro-asylum advocacy networks, including for self-inter-
ested reasons. Enlightened self-interest and solidarity 
with those at the bottom of the social hierarchy are 
not necessarily opposed to one another. ‘There but 
for the grace of God go I’, is a common sentiment 
expressed whatever the original reason for getting 
involved. The question of how people get involved in 
pro-asylum advocacy networks is difficult to answer, 
and there may be an element of pre-disposition 
through identification, as the two individual profiles 
presented in this chapter illustrate. We will not repli-
16 Helen Hintjens, 2007: “The War for Illegals”, in Bad 
Subjects website special issue on “Hope”; at: <http://bad.
eserver.org/issues/2007/78/> (29 November 2008).
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in the European context (Della Porta/Tarrow 2005). 
Instead we focus on some limited cases, where our 
shared experience has made it possible to observe 
longer-term processes of engagement from within. 
Campaigning involves the shared goal of making 
visible those whose experiences are denied in official 
migration deterrence policies (Cohen 2001; Sereny 
2003). A common response is outrage at the cruelties 
of official policies among pro-asylum advocacy 
groups. However, a sense of horror can turn people 
off, as well as engaging them. Refugees and asylum 
seekers may both engage and withdraw, at different 
times, depending on the nature of their responses to 
the horror and disgust they feel on learning of some 
new injustice perpetrated. Some are paralysed as they 
are re-traumatized in the asylum process; others avoid 
depression by becoming even more actively engaged 
(Cohen 2001; MacDonald 2006). Those involved in 
pro-asylum advocacy networks tend to share not only 
a sense of being ‘in the know’, but also of having 
shared projects based on defending principles of hu-
man rights and solidarity. Individual and group depor-
tations, hunger strikes and similar actions can help 
produce forms of resistance-based identities. These 
identities enable people involved in pro-asylum advo-
cacy to remain engaged, even in the face of growing 
risks to themselves. Some pro-asylum advocates view 
“…autonomous migration [as]…a form of resistance to 
global apartheid enforced at nation-state [level]” 
(Spener 2008: 115), but this is not true of everyone. As 
with all ‘weapons of the weak’, resistance against the 
state of exclusion and global apartheid can take cov-
ert and sublimated forms. For PRIME in The Hague 
and NCADC across the UK, the focus is on protect-
ing individuals, families, and groups of mostly undoc-
umented, non-nationals from the triple threat of des-
titution, detention and deportation. 
1.5.1 The UK case: NCADC 
By 2007, the UK government claimed to have ‘mas-
tered’ immigration flows, and was Tipping the Bal-
ance. As, “the number of failed asylum applicants re-
moved each year exceeds the number predicted to 
have unfounded claims”, deportations exceeded appli-
cations from asylum seekers that were in 2006. A 
Home Office press release reported, “…in 2006 asy-
lum applications reached their lowest level since 1993, 
while the number of removals and deportations by 
the Immigration and Nationality Directorate hit an all-
time high”.17 A year later, Meg Hilliard, speaking for 
the Border Agency that had replaced the Immigration 
and Nationality Department of the Home Office, 
stated, “We will be pressing on, not going back-
ward…there is no need for an amnesty.”18 “A lot of 
hard work from a lot of people”, the Minister 
claimed, had gone into Tipping the Balance. Remov-
als rose to 71 per cent of rejected and withdrawn asy-
lum claims (‘unfounded’ in Home Office terms) in 
2005, compared with just 49 per cent in 2004. In De-
cember 2006, deportations were 109 per cent of the 
target, averaging 103 per cent for 2006 as a whole. 
This meant that 18,235 forced or voluntary deporta-
tions took place from the UK, compared with the 
17,780 people whose claims for asylum were denied 
or dropped. 
In the press, Alibhai-Brown described this achieve-
ment as “policies and practices of institutionalised sav-
agery, rebranded as efficiency”.19 Efficiency criteria 
like these, commonly used across Europe, are not pe-
culiar to the UK and can be seen as part of the under-
pinning of global apartheid (Fekete 2005: 5 – 9). Pro-
asylum advocates in the UK are becoming aware that 
refusal quotas and targets are part of inter-EU harmo-
nization, and of agreements like the Dublin Conven-
tion, which have made matters worse for those seek-
ing asylum. EU support for tighter controls may 
backfire, however, with questions starting to emerge – 
including in the European Parliament - about whether 
detention, expulsions and high refusal rates are inflict-
ing too high a price. 
The NCADC has been able to secure longer-term 
funding, but has come under pressure to change its 
campaigning style. For many years, NCADC had only 
one full-time, permanent campaigner, John O., who 
reluctantly retired in May 2010. The consistent em-
phasis of NCADC mailings has in the past been on 
connecting global, national, regional and individual 
17 See at: <http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/6353/aboutus/
tippingpointsresults4amend.pdf> (May 2009). UK 
Home Office, 2007: Public performance target: 
removing more failed asylum seekers than new 
anticipated unfounded applications (London: The 
Stationery Office)
18 The quotations in this paragraph derive from a letter 
sent in reply to Alan Williams (Swansea West) MP, 17
July 2007, in response to a letter on behalf of two con-
stituents taken into detention.  
19 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown: “The Brutal Reality of our Asy-
lum Policy”, in: The Independent. 27 February 2007; at: 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commenta-
tors/yasmin-alibhai-brown/yasmin-alibhaibrown-the-brutal-
reality-of-our-asylum-policy-437980.html> (l2 July 2009).
8 Helen Hintjens, Richa Kumar and Ahmed Pouriinjustice issues. E-mails circulated weekly reported on 
media reports, on court rulings, official government 
reports, international NGO research on countries of 
origin, academic studies and cases from all over the 
world. John O. also circulates individual cases and 
group campaigns related to charter flights, which ask 
for support in the form of faxes, e-mails and letters to 
MPs, airlines and government ministers. Individual 
and group cases mainly relate to the UK context, al-
though news on campaigns in other EU countries also 
circulates periodically, and are posted on the website. 
To safeguard its future, in 2008, NCADC secured Na-
tional Lottery funding for three years, and became a 
registered charity. One condition of charitable status, 
however, is not to engage in political campaigning, 
and NCADC must therefore appear independent if it 
is to remain financially secure in the future. Most 
NCADC members feel uneasy with the forced politi-
cal neutrality of the shared injustice frames because 
they blame the government for detentions and depor-
tations as well as sharing a sense of moral outrage at 
the, unavoidably political, act of human rights viola-
tions. Three paid staff positions now depend on 
meeting charitable status conditions that tend to un-
dermine the appeal of NCADC, which is precisely its 
interconnected, holistic and very political worldview. 
Created in 1995, NCADC has engaged with the 
rise of forcible deportation policies, through a grow-
ing engagement with government ministers, but also 
with private security companies, regular and charter 
airlines. Since 1996, NCADC takes credit for prevent-
ing 165 deportations, as well as other (uncountable) 
cases where their intervention may have helped pre-
vent deportation. Although this figure is tiny in rela-
tion to the numbers of deportations, NCADC claims 
that running a campaign using the NCADC website 
and e-mail list, writing letters, signing petitions, and 
sending faxes, involving MPs, neighbours and the me-
dia, can work. In recent years, national campaigns 
have also been mounted by NCADC affiliates against 
group deportations and charter flights, for example 
to Iraq, Afghanistan, Zimbabwe and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). An outstanding example 
of such an NCADC campaign was the 2007 DRC 
(Congo-Kinshasa) anti-deportation charter flight cam-
paign. 
1.5.2 The DRC Charter Campaign: A 
Qualified Failure 
Even after more than ten years of continuous warfare 
and violence, with millions of documented deaths 
and hundreds of thousands of cases of rape, forced 
deportations to the DRC continue from most West 
European countries. Estimates suggest that up to 10
million Congolese have died due to chronic hunger, 
displacement, sexual violence and killings resulting 
from the war that started in 1998. Forced labour af-
fects the population in mineral-rich areas, few public 
services operate at all, and hunger, disease, child la-
bour and sexual violence are all rife. The regime in 
power views returned asylum seekers as political ene-
mies who can be detained, tortured and even killed 
(Hintjens 2006b; Fekete 2006). In 2007 Rudi Vis, 
MP, tabled an early day motion in the UK House of 
Commons (EDM 926, 21.22007) demanding an end 
to deportations to DRC, because of human rights vio-
lations by the Kinshasa government. EDM 926 called 
for cancellation of a charter flight due to deport 30
Congolese on 26 February 2007, since their removal 
would constitute “a grave violation of their Article 3 
human rights as provided for in the Geneva Conven-
tion”. Before 26 February, five MPs had signed EDM 
926.20 Forty-five more signed after the charter flight 
had left.
The NCADC campaign was significant for several 
reasons. As John O. reported, this campaign mobi-
lized “the biggest and best response to an appeal to 
stop a deportation in the 12 years of [NCADC’s] exist-
ence”.21 A loose network of affiliated campaign 
groups shared the view that whatever could be done 
to prevent deportation, even at the last minute, 
should be done, in this case, and however slim the 
chances of success. Outrage at human rights viola-
tions involved was the basis for counter-politics of 
hope, since, as the NCADC website put it: 
Unjust and inhumane deportations are tearing families 
apart, forcing asylum seekers back to countries where 
20 The text is as follows: EDM 926 DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO 21.02.2007, Vis, Rudi “That 
this House believes that further deportations to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo should be suspended 
with immediate effect based on evidence that failed asy-
lum seekers risk being subjected to serious mistreatment 
and imprisonment on return and that this amounts to a 
grave violation of their Article 3 human rights as pro-
vided for in the Geneva Convention; and that, in partic-
ular, the mass removal of Democratic Republic of 
Congo asylum seekers on 26th February 2007 on a spe-
cially chartered XL Airways flight should not be allowed 
to proceed”. See at: <http://edmi.parliament.uk/ EDMi/
EDMDetails.aspx?EDMID=32646&SESSION=885>.
21 Personal E-mail from John O. in response to a question 
by the researcher, 27 February 2007.
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the right to a relationship. These are the reasons that 
motivated campaigners and supporters to get together 
with those facing deportation and do something about 
it…. Never doubt that a small group of dedicated people 
can defeat an attempt to deport someone. An Anti-
Deportation Campaign involves organizing resistance to 
restrictive immigration legislation, and simply means 
making the government change their minds regarding 
an individual case.22
The central method of all NCADC advocacy is to 
write, send faxes and e-mail airline companies, gover-
nment Ministers, private companies, and to contact 
MPs and media to support campaigns for people not 
to be deported, but to be allowed to remain in the 
UK. Court cases are also undertaken, concerning 
country-based deportation policies, for example in re-
lation to the DRC. What was new about the DRC 
campaign was how it managed to mobilize existing, 
global and UK-wide networks of anti-corporate cam-
paigners. A company called, XL.com, an on-line glo-
bal travel company operated the DRC Charter. Mass 
faxing and letter writing was accompanied by both 
physical picketing of XL.com’s headquarters, and 
heavy use of the customer complaints facility on the 
XL.com website.23 The campaign letter appealed to 
XL.com’s commercial self-interest as follows: “I 
would therefore urge you to reconsider your involve-
ment, present and future, in such schemes, until your 
company has fully appraised itself of the available evi-
dence. There seems a great risk that negative media 
attention to the outcomes of such 'deportation char-
ters' to war zones could be commercially damaging 
for XL airlines.”24 
On 26 February 2007, in spite of the largest cam-
paign in NCADC history to-date, the UK government 
forcibly deported “more than 40 people” back to 
DRC. They, “were loaded onto the plane that day, 
handcuffed and distressed, the children crying, and … 
accompanied by around 150 police and escorts”. 
Showing its more political side, the NCADC e-mail 
also commented that “the whole exercise smacked of 
conspiracy between the British and DRC authori-
ties”.25 For example, a party held at the deportees’ ar-
rival in Kinshasa was reportedly filmed, footage that 
could have been used to show that those deported to 
DRC were not in any danger. Congolese in UK were 
meanwhile taking the government to court, disputing 
continued deportations to DRC. The UK government 
eventually won this case, after a hearing in 2008, and 
documented video evidence from the BBC of torture 
risks facing returned asylum seekers did not convince 
the judge that the UK government should stop depor-
tations to DRC. The suggestion made by NCADC is 
of collusion between sending and receiving countries 
in denying basic rights to former asylum seekers 
(Fekete 2005). In Europe, as also “[i]n many African 
countries…refugees are accused of being the cause of 
economic hardship and social ills” (Kibreab 1999: 
400), and refugee militarization can lead to former 
asylum seekers being accused of criminal activities 
(Muggah 2006).  
Despite mounting evidence of serious human 
rights abuses, torture and killings on return, the UK 
Home Office (and other EU governments) continue 
to deport people by force to war zones in the DRC, 
Iraq and Afghanistan. The DRC anti-deportation cam-
paign failed to achieve its goal, as expressed in EDM 
962. Even so, the campaign can be considered suc-
cessful. Considerable pressure was brought to bear on 
22 National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns
(NCADC); at: <http://www.ncadc.org/> includes a list 
of successful cases defended, 141 in all, totalling more 
than 300 people. See at: <http://www.ncadc.org.uk/
about/profile.htm>.
23 XL.com’s website was flooded with customer com-
ments in the form of “polite complaints” from members 
of NCADC, NoBorders and anti-corporate networks 
used to challenging private corporations on their own 
commercial turf, as it were. Just 18 months later, 
XL.com filed for bankruptcy. See at: <http://www.fly-
ertalk.com/forum/british-airways-executive-club/
865321-xl-com-now-collapses-3rd-biggest-uk-tour-opera-
tor.html> (2 December 2008). A company with the 
same name continues to operate from a French-regis-
tered website in France. The controversy with XL Air-
lines and NCADC was later reported. See at: <http://
www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2007/08/379320.html> (21
August 2007). 
24 Dear XL Airlines letter, from NCADC website. The 
decision to stop charter flights was reported in an 
article in the independent. See Verkaik: “Major airline 
refuses to help with forcible removal of immigrants”, in: 
The Independent, Monday, 8 October 2007; at: <http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/major-airline-
refuses-to-help-with-forcible-removal-of-immigrants-394451.
html> (18 December 2009).The article reports that “In 
an email to a campaign group which supports failed 
asylum seekers, XL said its chief executive had told the 
Government it had not ‘fully understood’ the political 
dimensions of these flights. In February, one of its 
aircraft was used to deport 40 failed asylum-seekers to 
the Democratic Republic of Congo as part of the 
Government's ‘operation castor’”.
25 NCADC e-mail, 5 March 2007, sent to NCADC list by 
Liz Atherton.
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tees, portrayed as innocent women and children. This 
threatened to damage the company’s reputation, and 
XL.com soon announced that the company would no 
longer charter planes for deportation purposes. The 
company even declared its “sympathy for all dispos-
sessed people in the world”.26 Here is a case where 
NCADC anti-deportation advocacy benefited from in-
volvement of the Congolese themselves, mobilized 
and organized around the pending court case against 
the UK government, and involvement of mainstream 
anti-corporate protest movements, with their on-line 
and direct action tactics and strategies tried and 
tested. When airline (and other) companies accept 
contracts to deport and detain, they can expect to 
face public scrutiny, and as in this case, organized ob-
jections and direct protests. The nexus of rights advo-
cacy formed during the DRC campaign enabled the 
NCADC campaign to reach the soft commercial un-
derbelly of XL.com, using public interest and human 
rights arguments effectively.  
Through John O., NCADC consistently reports 
human rights violations by private companies in the 
detention estate, companies such as Group 4 and GSL 
(Global Solutions Ltd). Official reports of Her Ma-
jesty’s Prison Inspector, Anne Owens, find repeatedly 
that there is inadequate medical care, poor legal sup-
port and poor facilities, including for children’s edu-
cation. During the deportation process, the use of 
force has become evident across the EU (Fekete 
2005). In mid-2008, Medical Justice, a UK charity 
connected with NCADC, released: Outsourcing 
Abuse, a report that documentted dozens of cases of 
beatings and brutality against detainees, by private se-
curity company staff.27 Home Secretary Jacqui Smith 
soon appointed Nuala O’Loan, former Police Om-
budsman for Northern Ireland, and now in the House 
of Lords, to conduct an independent enquiry. Results 
were still awaited at the time of finalizing this chapter. 
However, new legal and financial sanctions for those 
who refuse voluntary removal indicate the direction of 
government thinking on the rights of deportees. A 
person who refuses to leave with the The Internatio-
nal Organization for Migration (IOM) can be denied 
re-entry to the UK for 5 to 10 years, and may even be 
charged the full cost of their deportation. 
1.5.3 Netherlands: Generaal Pardon and 
Criminalization of PRIME 
Meanwhile, in early 2007, the Netherlands announced 
a general pardon. After years of campaigning and pe-
titioning the Queen, 26,000 undocumented people 
were to benefit from the regularization process. How-
ever, when viewed from within an organization like 
PRIME that works mainly with undocumented mi-
grants themselves, most of them former asylum seek-
ers, what followed the announcement was quite dif-
ferent. Just as success lay behind the failed DRC anti-
deportation campaign, here there were mainly failings 
that prevented many who had hoped to be eligible 
from qualifying for amnesty. The way that the Gene-
raal Pardon linked explicitly to speeding up deporta-
tion measures against those who were not eligible for 
legalization, belied the façade of generosity. The cam-
paign backfired in a way, for it led to some gain at the 
expense of others who were more easily singled out 
and deported; the amnesty offer acted like a lure.
PRIME’s tiny offices have moved several times in 
recent years, weakening an organization that has 
worked with the undocumented since the mid-1990’s. 
PRIME suffers from chronic under-resourcing, and 
there are few full-time volunteers left. The organiza-
tion has depended on only two or three people for 
many years for its core activities, which include visit-
ing and phoning people in detention centres, liaison 
with the destitute, campaigns, publishing news and re-
sponding to urgent requests from those confronting 
destitution, detention and deportation. Some years 
ago, PRIME was quite a large organization, with a 
sizeable budget, including from the local municipality, 
ran several ‘safe houses’ for people forced into desti-
tution. By 2005, the organization focused entirely on 
anti-detention and anti-deportation work, mostly with 
people who spoke Farsi or a related language. Re-
search on this chapter started around 2006, right be-
fore amnesty. PRIME staff and volunteers were inten-
sively involved in assisting individuals hoping to 
benefit from this new policy at this time.28 
PRIME estimates that less than half of the original 
figure of 26,000 were in fact regularized after 2007.29
26 Robert Verkaik: “Major airline refuses to help with for-
cible removal of immigrants”, The Independent, 9 Octo-
ber 2007; at: <http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/legal/
article3038391.ece> (30 November 2009). 
27 Robert Verkaik, “Investigations into claims of abuse on 
asylum-seekers”, The Independent, Tuesday 30 Septem-
ber 2008; at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/
home-news/investigation-into-claims-of-abuse-on-asylum-
seekers-946106.html> (16 November 2009). 
28 Helen Hintjens, 2007: “The War for Illegals”, in Bad 
Subjects website special issue on “Hope”; at: <http://bad.
eserver.org/issues/2007/78/> (29 November 2008).
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bility. PRIME supported his case, but in 2009, he re-
ceived a refusal from the Dutch Immigration and Na-
tionality Department (IND). Fearing deportation to 
Afghanistan, he decided to move to the UK, where he 
had discovered his brother had full refugee status. The 
Afghani was detained on arrival in UK, without pa-
pers, and placed in a private correctional facility. Here 
he was held for four months, unable to contact his 
brother. Yet by being in detention, he had fallen foul 
of a rule attached to the General Pardon, that anyone 
detained for more than three months (for any reason) 
was not eligible to be regularized. Detention for immi-
gration purposes in the EU, however, does not imply 
any criminal activity (Bacon 2006). This man decided 
to continue living underground, but was now more 
vulnerable to deportation.  
Using an amnesty to expose illegal migrants from 
their hiding places was a cynical ploy, but is under-
standable in the context of heightened surveillance 
and harassment of the undocumented across Europe. 
Rian Ederveen of Stichting LOS confirms that chari-
ties working with the undocumented were subjected 
to close police controls after Generaal Pardon was an-
nounced. Lia Matheu works on migrant’s rights in 
The Hague, an advocate for Portuguese-speaking Afri-
cans. She explains starkly that “(t)hey are chasing peo-
ple out; and deportations have been explicitly linked 
to the Generaal Pardon ruling” (interview, 11 June 
2007). When central government, seeking to speed up 
deportations, tried to oblige local governments to 
hand over lists of undocumented people, however, al-
most all refused to comply.30 As PRIME has tried to 
explain to policymakers, distrust is reinforced by such 
underhanded ways of operating.31 
Even PRIME has received unwelcome police atten-
tion since 2007. One day in 2008, staff and volunteers 
who left the PRIME offices were picked up, one by 
one, and taken to the local police station. They were 
not allowed to phone anyone, and were told they 
were being held under anti-terrorism legislation. This 
started at 4 p.m. and continued until 9 p.m., when 
Ahmed Pouri was the last to leave the building. The 
police released everyone, and later explained that un-
der new anti-terrorism laws, they were obliged to fol-
low up on all accusations. A man had gone to the po-
lice station, someone known to have mental health 
problems, and had alleged that PRIME were making 
bombs in their offices. Anti-terrorism procedures 
then required police to take everyone to the police 
station for questioning, before releasing them. The 
next day, flowers were sent to PRIME by way of an 
apology, but for some volunteers the whole experi-
ence proved too distressing and they stopped coming 
to PRIME. Some volunteers had no papers, and so 
felt especially terrified to be detained by police. While 
seasoned campaigners laughed the incident off, volun-
teers were intimidated in a perfectly legal way, thus 
undermining PRIME.  
With fragility and under-funding of many pro-asy-
lum advocacy organizations across the EU, it is hard 
to come across serious, legitimate leadership. Pro-asy-
lum advocacy networks attract few resources, and 
working against the democratic government’s policies 
is not an attractive option for society’s most promi-
nent, as well as most marginalized, people. Asylum ad-
vocates may be settled refugees who combine pro-asy-
lum advocacy with a paid job, or may simply 
volunteer. They may be Europeans who find the inhu-
manity of the asylum regime disturbing enough to be 
galvanized to get involved. Lawyers, social workers 
and religious leaders may all get involved because they 
deplore the secrecy and lack of accountability they see 
in the immigration regime and in detention and de-
portation policies. In Australia, media people are 
prominent in pro-asylum advocacy, as are artists and 
intellectuals (Hintjens/Jarman 2003). Within the 
‘spaces outside the law’, as Agamben calls them, it is 
very possible however to be forgotten by the rest of 
society (Agamben 2005).   
29 Ahmed Pouri; Helen Hintjens: “Hunger Strikers 
attacked inside Schiphol’s Detention Centre”, PRIME 
Press Release, 9 March 2009; at: <http://indymedia.nl/
nl/2009/03/58112.shtml> (2 June 2009).
30 Edestad, “Geen medewerking aan uitzetting vreemdelin-
gen die buiten pardon vallen”, 19 July 2007; at: <http://
www.edestad.nl/index.php/module\615> (4 August 2008).
31 Interview with Lia Matheu, pro-asylum advocate, The 
Hague, 20 June 2009; Ahmed Pouri; Helen Hintjens: 
“Hunger Strikers attacked inside Schiphol’s Detention 
Centre”, PRIME Press Release, 9 March 2009; at: <http://
indymedia.nl/nl/2009/03/58112.shtml> (2 June 2009).
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The two women we will call Susan (UK) and Femke 
(the Netherlands) were each involved voluntarily in 
pro-asylum advocacy work for many years. Susan 
worked with Asylum Justice, a local organization in 
South Wales, loosely affiliated with NCADC. Femke 
has worked with PRIME in The Hague for many years 
and in pro-asylum advocacy for almost 30 years. Nei-
ther woman, however, had any formal legal training. 
Both Susan and Femke suffer from serious clinical de-
pression, and must take medication. They have their 
depression in common with many failed asylum seek-
ers. Although Susan has a full-time day job, Femke 
does not, and for both women, the work on asylum 
rights has become a way of life, something pivotal to 
their worldview. They both see asylum as a metaphor 
for the injustice in the world, but also for a politics of 
hope, which they share. Each identifies herself closely 
with the broader refugee experience of displacement 
and isolation. Each can make sense of the world and 
identify her own small, inter-connected, contribution 
to promoting the rights of those even worse off than 
herself. Susan's involvement with asylum issues started 
in 2005 following the forced dispersal of asylum seek-
ers to her town in the UK. Femke began to help in a 
local detention centre during the 1970’s. Each has 
been involved in all aspects of pro-asylum work, from 
the mundane, involving social events, to the most tech-
nical, assisting in legal cases and training in asylum law 
and human rights. They have translated documents, vis-
ited detained people, campaigned against deportations 
and helped destitute people and families. 
Each woman now has a wealth of experience of 
the asylum regime, and as intermediaries between the 
system and the individual claimants. Femke makes 
this clear when she explains how she helped interpret 
between asylum seekers and officials in the detention 
centre, translating the asylum seekers’ stated needs 
into terms understood by the officials, lawyers, bu-
reaucrats, doctors and other professionals working in 
the centre. Susan also sees her work with Asylum Jus-
tice in terms of interpreting the law for asylum seekers 
who wish to lodge appeals, for example. Femke visits 
many individual detainees who phone her to tell her 
of their experiences in the prison or detention centre. 
Her work has mainly involved facilitating access 
where possible to a lawyer, a doctor, somewhere to 
live. In South Wales and in The Hague, most charities 
hand out food donations, but rarely get involved in le-
gal, housing, health or employment rights. 
Susan became involved a few years after Asylum 
Justice was first set up to resist the claim of the offi-
cial legal aid system that it “…sifts out worthy from 
unworthy forced migrants” (Bhabha 2002: 160). Su-
san and Femke each talked at length about how de-
structive the asylum process can be of individual appli-
cants’ personal potential and talents. Both women 
remarked on the chronic failure of the system to pro-
vide adequate legal aid. Each expressed frustration 
that without legal aid, asylum seekers could not con-
vince the courts (or get bail in the UK). Few would 
win their appeals and many would be deported, or liv-
ing in destitution once more. This depressed both 
women, but they were also determined to do some-
thing positive to influence the situation they found 
around them, together with others. 
Susan and Femke share disgust at the mainstream 
media attitudes towards asylum seekers and undocu-
mented people, and both admit to a deepening sense 
of outrage at public and political attitudes, which have 
worsened since a few years ago. Each expressed fear 
that the stress and anger their awareness of the asy-
lum system brought had not only taken over their 
lives, but was also damaging their health. Campaign-
ing against the 3-Ds, Susan and Femke knew many in-
dividuals and families who daily inhabited a state of 
exception, and were alternately destitute, detained 
and subject to deportation. Each woman described 
how this altered her previous sense of normality. The 
cruelty inflicted on people they knew, or had met and 
spoken to, shocked these women, and Susan helped—
together with a refugee friend—to set up a group for 
refugee and asylum seeker women, caring for children 
while mothers met for shared activities. Volunteer 
work by women like Susan and Femke keeps most 
pro-asylum advocacy organizations going, and makes 
their networks operate in a way that is open and re-
ceptive to people in crisis. Both women consider it a 
waste of human potential, that destitute and detained 
people, women and children, and isolated and root-
less young men remain trapped in the 3-Ds, or in fear 
of them, despite many already having experienced tor-
ture, rape and political persecution at home. 
The two women report that their lives have 
changed completely through their growing involve-
ment with pro-asylum advocacy in the UK and the 
32 Interviews and discussions were conducted with Susan 
(not real name) and Femke (not real name) in Swansea 
and The Hague, respectively, in December 2008 and 
September 2009. We are grateful to both women for 
their insights, and for being so open with us. We hope 
to publish these interviews in full elsewhere, along with 
others gathered during this research. 
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fested in individuals, motivated them to become in-
volved, and to become pro-asylum advocates. They 
both opposed what they saw as a globally designed, 
locally manifested system of separations, unjust laws 
and physical controls (global apartheid). It is interest-
ing that both women, through their pro-asylum advo-
cacy work, have re-evaluated their own depression, 
and have radically reorganized their worldviews, as 
well as their private lives, to hold a broad set of 
‘shared injustice frames’.
1.6 Harmonizing Exclusion 
Across the EU, and beyond, serious rights violations 
are being justified in the name of the priority of se-
cure borders (Huysmans 2006). Even to the point of 
compromising the right to seek asylum. Non-discrimi-
nation principles are flouted, the right to a fair trial 
and a fair hearing of one’s case are ignored, and the 
right not to be arbitrarily detained is disappearing. 
Citizenship and the right to family life are being 
eroded, and most undocumented people have little or 
no access to education, health, work or legalization. 
Those seeking sanctuary can fall outside of the protec-
tion of international, regional and national human 
rights provisions, if they are refused. Under ‘fast-track’ 
asylum procedures in the UK, as in the Netherlands, 
deportations happen almost on arrival (Dummett 
2001; Bhabha 2009, Webber 2000). Although Article 
31 of the Geneva Convention specifically ensures that 
a person can seek asylum, and lodge their claim, what-
ever their documented status, legislation across the 
EU is making it a crime to enter a country with false 
papers. There are few signs that this ‘migration deter-
rence regime’ is weakening; on the contrary (Fekete 
2001). EU harmonization has simply speeded up the 
process. As Helton reminds us, “Cooperation…is not 
necessarily synonymous with generosity. In Western 
Europe it has been directed mainly at enforcement 
measures designed to frustrate the arrival of asylum 
seekers and to encourage them either to remain in 
their home country or locate in a nearby country of 
asylum” (Helton 2002: 272).
And setting numerical quotas and rejection targets 
arguably violates the legal basis of refugee law, by pro-
moting the speedy return of people to countries 
where they may face danger and further risk of perse-
cution (Helton 2002: 123). The Congolese charter 
flight campaign is an example of where security con-
cerns receive priority over human rights or even legal 
procedures; the DRC court case was pending at the 
time of the 2007 deportation. 
Ministers, and some policymakers, claim that all 
this harsh treatment is unavoidable to make life un-
pleasant for those who abuse the system. Bogus asy-
lum seekers, criminal networks, smugglers, traffickers 
and all manner of scroungers and spongers are to be 
warned off by every greater cruelty. They must be 
stopped from exploiting loopholes in border controls; 
they must be deterred from misusing the asylum sys-
tem. The claim is that in this way, asylum will be safe 
for ‘genuine’ asylum seekers. However, the question 
remains how the latter are to get through the mine-
field laid down for everyone else. By blaming suppos-
edly ‘bogus’ claimants for their own policies of victim-
ization, the government get off the hook, blaming the 
victim for using deterrence (Ryan 1971; Nyers 2003; 
Webber 2000). Victim blaming tends to “normalize or 
naturalize unjust and violent social and political condi-
tions” (Leatherman 2005: 12). At the same time, wel-
fare and employment guarantees for citizens have all 
but dried up, and states feel “[n]o longer in full charge 
of the economy, security or culture”, unable to pro-
vide, “…the whole-life protection from the cradle to 
the grave which [they] not so long ago strove to pro-
vide” (Bauman 2007: 45). Victim-blaming occurs when 
“…refugees…[are] accused of being the cause of eco-
nomic hardship and social ills” (quotation Kibreab 
1999: 400; Muggah 2006). In the heart of ‘Fortress 
Europe’, growing “[i]gnorance, incredulity and indif-
ference…may be as significant hurdles...as disagree-
ment or hostility” (Bhabha 2002: 158). Media reports 
on illegal immigrants reinforces a climate of denial 
equated with, “…criminal organizations, terrorists and 
drug traffickers [that] threaten the citadels of civiliza-
tion” (quotation Nederveen Pieterse 2004: 110; Bau-
man 2007: 128; Bhabha 2002: 161 – 2). 
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter has tried to contextualize the shared per-
spectives and frames of pro-asylum advocates within 
the EU, using examples familiar to us. We proposed 
that both global apartheid and the EU-wide state of 
exception are underpinning deterrence policies of in-
dividual governments towards asylum seekers and 
other migrants. The 3-D strategy, based on destitu-
tion, detention and deportation, is a particular focus 
of pro-asylum advocacy and resistance to the existing 
legislation and policies. The state of exception, for ex-
ample in asylum detention camps, makes sense as a 
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physical barriers combine with increasingly sophisti-
cated forms of internal surveillance of the population, 
to screen people out as well as in. In short, under glo-
bal apartheid and the EU state of exception, “the in-
stitution of asylum has become a key pressure point, 
complicating the filtering process…designed to sepa-
rate eligible from ineligible travelers” (Bhabha 2002: 
161). At the same time, basic social and economic 
rights have been severely eroded across Europe, for 
everyone. As the quotation from Agamben at the start 
of this chapter made clear, ever more ingenious forms 
of exclusion and surveillance of non-nationals can end 
up being used against all EU citizens and those living 
in the EU, as wider processes of rights-erosion are fa-
cilitated and obscured (Fekete 2001, 2009, Webber 
2000). Engaged in an unseemly ‘scramble to make 
themselves unattractive’, EU member states pay little 
attention to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Harvey 2000: 368). Cross-EU harmonization 
snares innocents, as genuine refugees are caught in 
traps set for traffickers, smugglers and all manner of 
‘illegal’ persons as if they were game animals (Harvey 
2000; Collyer 2007). Across the globe, camps are 
“made permanent by a blocking of their exits” (Bau-
man 2007: 45), which works to “reinforce…the mouldy 
and decaying walls meant to guard the hallowed dis-
tinction between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ [in 
a]…world that pays little if any respect” to this distinc-
tion (Bauman 2004: 58). Blatant contradictions result, 
with myths of inclusiveness and daily strategies of vic-
tim-blaming coexisting in, “a borderless economy and 
a barricaded border” (Andreas 2000: p. x).
Just as South African apartheid and colonial segre-
gation were enshrined in law, so the ‘state of excep-
tion’ that underpins today’s deterrence regime across 
the EU is legally encoded and based on EU-wide pro-
visions. The key starting point was a 2002 EU Direc-
tive and Framework Decision on, “Strengthening the 
penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unau-
thorised entry, transit and residence.” This has cre-
ated more and more difficulties and obstacles for pro-
asylum advocacy work as “the authorities have wid-
ened the net of those suspected of unacceptable soli-
darity” (Fekete 2009: 84). However, Fekete sees in 
this an “intention … not so much to prosecute more 
people but to warn those in civil society and public of-
fice that the threat of prosecution is real and immi-
nent” (Fekete 2009: 84). Moreover, 
…threat of prosecution now hangs over those who take 
part in direct action in support of the refugee sanctuary 
movement or hunger strikers, those who provide hous-
ing for the undocumented or refuse to provide informa-
tion to the authorities on their residence status, those 
who expose conditions within detention centres or sim-
ply defend the rights of detainees (Fekete 2009: 84). 
It is becoming illegal in more and more countries of 
the EU to help undocumented migrants, or to sup-
port struggles for their basic rights, including the right 
to legalization. In France, an underground movement 
has emerged. In the UK, grassroots support for the 
idea of sanctuary is growing. Already there are 11 or so 
‘Cities of Sanctuary’ in the UK, including Sheffield, 
London, and Swansea in South Wales. As government 
threatens to convict those that campaign for undocu-
mented people, whole cities are declaring themselves 
supportive.33 Small pro-asylum advocacy organizations 
across the EU, like NCADC and PRIME, are strug-
gling during the present financial crisis, besieged by 
an atmosphere of fire-fighting and stretched re-
sources. Strategic and tactical alliances with progres-
sive lawyers, well-meaning policymakers and various 
communities have become more urgent than ever. 
Working against the 3-Ds in the UK or the Nether-
lands has become more difficult as the deterrence re-
gime is stepped up and the legacy of the ‘war on ter-
ror’ appears to merge with the ‘war on insecurity’. 
This painful and contradictory situation attracts new 
supporters, because of the mounting evidence of offi-
cial abuses, of even children and the disabled (Craw-
ley/Lester 2005; Bauman 2004). This frightens off 
otherwise well-meaning people from getting involved. 
When members of the UK Royal Society for the Pro-
tection of Birds, for example, are threatened with le-
gal action, to prevent them demonstrating against en-
vironmental damage, it is high time everyone sat up 
and acted to protect our civil liberties.34 
Eventually, any system of segregation that excludes 
increasing numbers of people from its protective sur-
veillance starts to lose legitimacy and finds itself con-
fronted with widespread resistance (Richmond 1994; 
Cohen 1987). Failed asylum seekers, ‘illegals’, undocu-
mented migrants and people sans papiers are helots, 
or as Bauman puts it “…the dregs, the waste and 
rejects of…global free trade and economic progress” 
(Bauman 2007: 22; Cohen 1987). Caught between the 
“unheard-of-affluence” of the few and the “unspeaka-
33 See at: <http://www.cityofsanctuary.com/> (l3 January 
2010). 
34 Martin Hickman “Heathrow puts up legal barricades to 
keep away protesters”, The Independent, 27 July 2007. 
See at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this- 
britain/heathrow-puts-up-legal-barricades-to-keep-away-
protesters-459177.html> (l2 November 2009). 
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advocates also are subjected to “fears and gruesome 
premonitions” of a world divided against itself (Bau-
man 2007: 22). In this context, pro-asylum advocacy is 
an increasingly uphill struggle, and increasingly indis-
pensable. 
Tentatively, then our conclusions are that, arising 
from global apartheid as reinforced by the state of 
exception at EU level, pro-asylum advocacy networks 
share common perceptions of the global system as 
fundamentally unjustifiable. They operate to resist the 
dominant logic of deterrence in the EU, and it is this, 
rather than shared tactics or strategies of resistance 
per se, that creates solidarities among such advocates. 
Today, within the EU, direct citizen action against the 
3-Ds continues, within a context that requires close 
coordination. Even in a hostile legal and political cli-
mate, pro-asylum advocacy make sense to those 
involved, given the shared worldviews that have 
emerged to connect people across barriers of class, 
belief, legal status and local context to defend the 
right to sanctuary. 

